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Abstract—Although nuclear non-proliferation is an almost
universal human desire, in practice, the negotiated treaties
appear unable to prevent the steady growth of the number of
states that have nuclear weapons. We propose a computational
model for understanding the complex issues behind nuclear arms
negotiations, the motivations of various states to enter a nuclear
weapons program and the ways to diffuse crisis situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous international treaties are made with the best of
intentions. However, every treaty needs to be examined on
its actual affects rather than on its intentions. The Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly referred
to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) aimed to make the
world more secure from nuclear weapons. The treaty divided
all countries based on their nuclear status as of January 1,
1967, into nuclear weapon states (NWSs), which included
China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs),
which included all the other states. All the NWSs signed
the treaty as well as all the NNWSs except India, Israel and
Pakistan. North Korea is the only country that withdrew from
the treaty. Hence the NPT enjoyed a great popularity and is
often considered a great success.
The essence of the NPT is a bargain between the NWSs
and the NNWSs. The NWSs committed themselves to nuclear
disarmament and to help the NNWSs to develop civilian use
of nuclear technology. In return, the NNWSs committed them-
selves to foresake ever developing nuclear weapons. Unfortu-
nately, this bargain did not work out as planned. After forty
years, the NWSs increased the total number of their nuclear
weapons, while many NNWSs engaged in clandestine nuclear
weapon development programs. The world does not look safer
than it was forty years ago. Nevertheless, NPT defenders claim
that the NPT slowed down nuclear proliferation. In other
words, without the NPT, nuclear proliferation would have
been even worse than it is actually today. In this paper we
examine this hypothetical claim using game theory. We start
our analysis with some definitions.
Uranium enrichment is the process of dividing any ura-
nium compound into two parts, one part with a higher and
another part with a lower concentration of U 235 atoms.
Uranium ore has a very low percent of U 235 atoms. Most
nuclear reactors can work on low enriched uranium (LEU),
where the proportion of U 235 is less than 20 percent. Nuclear
bombs require highly enriched uranium (HEU), where the
proportion of U 235 is greater than 80 percent. The uranium
enrichment technology is the same for LEU and for HEU. To
obtain HEU, the uranium enrichment process simply needs to
be repeated several times until the desired level is reached.
Plutonium reposessing is the process of separating the
plutonium, a byproduct of uranium fission, from the rest of
the spent fuel in an uranium atomic reactor. The plutonium
can be used either as fuel for plutonium atomic reactors or as
material for plutonium atomic bombs.
Dual-use technology is any technology that can be used
for both civilian or military purposes. For example, uranium
enrichment and plutonium reposessing are both dual-use tech-
nologies.
The NPT allows any NNWS to aquire and develop any
dual-use nuclear technology. Moreover, citing the NPT, many
NNWSs expect the NWSs to provide assistance in aquiring
dual-use technologies including uranium enrichment and plu-
tonium reposessing. When a NNWS aquires these technolo-
gies, it essentially develops 80 percent of an atomic bomb
because civilian and military nuclear technologies largely
overlap. Such a NNWS could be tempted to invest the 20
percent extra effort required to develop an atomic bomb.
Hence any of its adversaries may become concerned whether
it will decide to develop a bomb. Moreover, these adversaries
need to be prepared for all eventuality. That means that these
adversaries also need to build up their NPT-allowed dual-
use nuclear technologies and be ready to activate a nuclear
weapons program of their own just in case any of their
adversary NNWSs decides to build a nuclear weapon. This
leads to a situation, which we define as follows.
Soft arms race occurs when states develop nuclear-related
dual-use technologies with the intent to be strategically pre-
pared to develop nuclear weapons.
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Several experts are concerned about a soft arms race in
the Middle East and North Africa, where many energy rich
states insist that they need to develop peaceful nuclear reactors.
Developing nuclear technology is expensive, and most of these
countries would not have been able to aquire any nuclear
technology without direct or indirect assistance from NWSs.
Hence the question can be raised whether the NPT contributed
to a soft arms race regarding nuclear technology. Further, if
there is a soft arms race, how likely it is to lead to an active
nuclear weapons program? We try to answer these difficult
questions using game theory, and thereby contributing to the
theoretical study of nuclear proliferation [2], [4], [8].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews
game theory and the history of its use for analyzing nuclear
issues. Section III describes a game theoretic analysis of the
NPT. Section IV gives a game theoretic analysis of what may
happen in a world without the NPT. Finally, Section V gives
some conclusions and offers some hope of improving the
current nuclear non-proliferation situation.
II. A REVIEW OF GAME THEORY
During the Cold War, game theory was a reasonable ap-
proach to arms control negotiations because nuclear tests
and total arsenal numbers were hard to verify. Virtually the
only thing that could be detected was an already approach-
ingintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). There was not
enough time and technological sophistication to shield against
nuclear ICBM strikes. Therefore, in case of a nuclear attack,
each side faced the choice between continued restraint or
nuclear retaliation. Table I shows the nuclear options of Russia
and the United States during the Cold War expressed in a
hypothetical payoff matrix using game theory [9]. The table
assumes that it would cost each side 20 points to be destroyed
in a nuclear attack. However, if any side is destroyed, at least
it can derive a satisfaction of five points by retaliating and
destroying the other side too.
Russia ↓ US → no strike first strike retaliation
no strike *0, 0* -20, 0* NA
first strike *0, -20 -20, -20 *-20, -15*
retaliation NA *-15, -20* NA
TABLE I: A hypothetical payoff matrix during the Cold War.
Clearly, some entries in the table, shown as NA, are not
available or logically impossible. For example, it is not possi-
ble to retaliate against something that did not happen. Even the
case of both countries deciding on a first strike simultaneously
would have an extremely small possibility. In this example,
game theory gives three Nash equilibrium points [3], which
are shown as the matrix entries with two stars, that is, one star
on the left and another star on the right of the entry. In this
case, the rational choice would be *0,0*, which is the best
equilibrium point for both sides. This is the game theoretic
explanation for how the mutually assured destruction (MAD)
nuclear posture worked during the Cold War.
The idea behind MAD is that if one side attacks, then it will
get destroyed. That is supposed to be the ultimate deterrence.
However, for it to work the leaders with access to the nuclear
triggers have to be non-delusional and non-suicidal (otherwise,
the payoff matrix values could change.) Unfortunately, that
cannot be guaranteed. Today there is an increasing danger that
not only possible delusional dictators but also terrorist chiefs
and suicide bombers may gain access to nuclear weapons.
The success of MAD also depended on maintaining a
retaliatory capability because MAD would be impossible if
either side could make a first strike that debilitates all the
nuclear weapons of the other side. This aspect of MAD tends
to lead to an arms race as both sides feel that they need some
extra (numerous and/or advanced) weapons to successfully
deter the other side.
Russia ↓ US → no strike first strike retaliation
no strike *0, 0* -20, 0* NA
first strike *0, -20* -20, -20* NA
retaliation NA *-15, -20* NA
TABLE II: Modified payoff matrix in case Russia would gain
completely debilitating first-strike capability.
To illustrate this last point, Table II shows the changed cost
matrix in case Russia could attain such a first strike capability.
Here the -20,-15 outcome would no longer be available, and
*0,-20* would be a new equilibrium point. Russia would prefer
the two equilibria *0,0* and *0,-20* to the third equilibrium *-
15,-20*. However, the first two equilibria would be extremely
unnerving to the U.S. population. This situation is symmetric.
Hence both sides need to maintain a retaliatory capability as
a credible deterrent. To maintain a retaliatory capability, both
sides kept secret the locations of their nuclear weapons and
increased the number of their nuclear warheads to very high
levels, leading to a nuclear arms race. Hence Table II is a game
theoretic explanation of the nuclear arms race during the Cold
War.
In summary, game theory provides insights for cases when
there is little or no trust between the participants. Since neither
side can trust the other side, they need to play safe first
and foremost. Game theory fails to account for trust among
the partners in negotiations. Normally, people participate in
negotiations because they trust that their partners will keep the
agreements, which can be enforced by verification procedures,
courts, or the threat of breaking off a relationship. Game
theory explains well the purely adversarial strategies but fails
to provide a realistic model for negotiations [5], [6], [7].
III. A GAME THEORERIC ANALYSIS OF THE NPT
In our analysis, we consider a set of variables shown in
the first two columns of Table III. The exact values of these
variables can be only estimated, which is something beyond
the scope of this paper. However, it is only the relative strength
of these variables that is important for our analysis. As shown
in the third column, each variable can have either a single
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None Reactor Bomb
NWS ally *0, 0 *0, 2* *−1, 1
NWS adversary *0, 0 −7, 3 −9, 4*
TABLE V: Payoff matrix.
number value, meaning that it is the same for all countries,
or it can have two different values for allied and adversary
countries, respectively. In the following, we index the variables
by 1 for allies and 2 for adversaries if there are differences in
values.
For each of the estimates, we provide some explanation in
the fourth column of Table III. We assume extra trade benefit
etb to the NWS states to be zero because the NWS countries
were forbidden to sell weapons-related nuclear technology to
other countries. This regulation restricted the market and the
clandestine transactions that still occurred seem to have been
done from political rather than from financial motivations [2].
Table IV shows a matrix where the last three columns
describe the three choices of any NNWS: (1) build nothing,
(2) build only peaceful nuclear reactors, and (3) build nuclear
bombs too. The two rows of the matrix describe the two
choices of any NWS. Each NWS could consider the NNWS
as either an ally or an adversary. Alliances can shift over long
periods of time due to strategic reasons.
Substituting the values in Table III for the variables in
Table IV, we obtain Table V. Table V shows that there is a
Nash equilibrium, again indicated by two stars, for any NWS
and NNWS pair. The Nash equilibrium would mean that the
two states would be allies and the NNWS would restrain itself
to only a peaceful use of nuclear energy. In practice, this Nash
equilibrium may not be reachable because states are locked
into various alliances due to other considerations. Hence some
countries are bound to remain NWS adversaries. Table V does
not show any equilibrium for NWS adversaries. In fact, a NWS
would rather have a NNWS adversary with no nuclear tech-
nology at all, while the NNWS would rather develop nuclear
weapons. The NWS could be naturally suspicious about the
peaceful intentions of any adversary NNWS. Hence the current
NPT environment encourages peaceful development of nuclear
energy among ally NNWSs. This leads to a soft arms race
among the ally NNWSs and their adversaries.
IV. ANALYSIS WITHOUT THE NPT
Imagine a world without the NPT. How the absence of
the NPT would effect the values of the variables listed in
Table III? First, the development cost for civilian nuclear
technology would increase in general. We estimate that for
NWS adversaries the development cost may double to 6 as
they would have to do essentially everything themselves or pay
heavy prices for nuclear technology. NWS allies would also
no longer get any free nuclear technology, although they may
be able to buy some at a discount. Hence their development
cost would increase to about 5.
None Reactor Bomb
NWS ally *0, 0* *0, −1 *−1, −4
NWS adversary *0, 0* −7, −1 −9, −2
TABLE VII: The revised payoff matrix.
When the price of civilian nuclear technology increases, the
demand decreases. The price increase and demand decrease
tend to cancel each other out, hence the trade benefit would not
change drastically. We continue to assume that trade benefit
is 1. With the increase of civilian nuclear technology, the price
of military nuclear technology would also increase. Hence the
extra development cost may increase from 2 to 3.
The decreased demand for civilian nuclear technology may
prevent the development of the soft arms race in dual-use
nuclear technology among the NNWSs. Therefore, the security
benefit of civilian nuclear reactors decreases to about 1 for
allies and 2 for adversaries. The extra security benefit would
decrease to 0 for allies and 2 for adversaries. At the same
time, the security cost and the extra security cost to NWSs
would remain the same because the NWSs would be still be
constrained and lose control over NNWSs that aquire nuclear
technology.
To summarize the above discussion, Table VI lists all the
variables whose values would be likely different in a world
without the NPT.
Repeating now the game theoretic analysis with the new
values as shown in Table VII reveals that the no NPT en-
vironment has a Nash equilibrium for both NWS allies and
NWS adversaries. In both cases the equilibrium implies the
choice of developing no nuclear technology.
V. CONCLUSION
We provided a game theoretic analysis of the choices of
NNWSs regarding the use of nuclear technology. According
to our estimates of the costs and benefits of certain strategies, it
appears that without the NPT, all NNWSs states would choose
no nuclear energy. On the other hand, with NPT the NNWS
allies of NWSs would choose to develop only civilian nuclear
energy, and the NNWS adversaries of NWSs would choose to
go all the way to developing nuclear weapons.
Hence according to our analysis, the NPT seems to have
made the world less secure by encouraging among the NNWSs
a soft arms race of dual-use nuclear technology. Although
only a few NNWSs would cross the threshold and later enter
an outright nuclear arms race, their entry seems more likely
because of the already present soft arms race.
These conclusions depend on the exact values of the costs
and the benefits. Each state can have a particular situation
which would mean that these values need to be adjusted. In
addition, our game theoretic analysis did not include many
other cultural, historical and political considerations that in-
fluence policy makers’ decisions regarding the development
of civilian or military nuclear technology. Hence we cannot
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Name Symbol Value Explanation
Energy benefit eb 3 Similar reactors always yield similar amount of energy.
Trade benefit (NWS) tb 1 Companies equally eager to sell to all.
Extra trade benefit (NWS) etb 0 Prohibited. Negligible commercial motivation for violations.
Development cost dc 3 Cost overruns are common in every country.
Extra development cost edc 2 Construction costs only. Sanctions belong to esb.
Security cost (NWS) sc 1, 8 Both allies and adversaries limit NWS countries’ freedom.
Extra security cost (NWS) esc 1, 2 However, allies are less dangerous.
Security benefit sb 2, 3 Allies already have security guarantees from NWS.
Extra security benefit esb 1, 3 Hence allies get a diminished return.
TABLE III: Variables used in the game theoretic analysis.
None Reactor Bomb
NWS ally 0, 0 tb− sc1, eb+ sb1 − dc tb+ etb− sc1 − esc1, eb+ sb1 − dc+ esb1 − edc
NWS adversary 0, 0 tb− sc2, eb+ sb2 − dc tb+ etb− sc2 − esc2, eb+ sb2 − dc+ esb2 − edc
TABLE IV: The choices of any pair of nuclear weapon state (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).
Name Symbol Value Explanation
Development cost dc 5, 6 Cost overruns are common in every country.
Extra development cost edc 3 Construction costs only. Sanctions belong to esb.
Security benefit sb 1, 2 Allies already have security guarantees from NWS.
Extra security benefit esb 0, 2 Hence allies get a diminished return.
TABLE VI: Variables with changed values.
draw from our game theoretic analysis any firm conclusion
about any particular state. Nevertheless, our game theoretic
model suggests that the NPT may have affected the cost and
benefit structure of the nuclear technology market, both overt
and covert, in a way that encourages instead of discourages
non-proliferation. This should raise a concern for the non-
proliferation community. The NPT, like any other international
treaty, should be evaluated by its actual affects instead of its
professed intent. Although the intent of the NPT was to prevent
proliferation, its actual affects may have been the opposite.
Our pessimistic analysis of the effects of the NPT, need
not be the end of the story. Although it is unlikely that the
NPT can be abandoned completely, there are some promising
current suggestions by some nuclear non-proliferation experts.
One proposal is to offer to replace free the older reactors
that produce significant amounts of plutonium with newer
Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors (LFTRs), which allows for
fuel utilization exceeding 99 percent and produces very little
weapons grade material. Such a replacement offer may cut
down on the temptation to repossess plutonium and use it or
sell it to other states. We hope that continued arms control
negotiations will lead to a solution that is both well-intentioned
and mathematically sound.
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